Paper prepared for the International Conference on "Democratization and Globalization in Korea Assessments and Prospects", Seoul, August 18-19, 1997

We are, at the dawn of the 21st century, faced with the historical transformation of contemporary world order.  In the 1990s, the Cold War international order built around the U.S. and Soviet Union from the end of World War Ⅱ was superseded by post-Cold War history.  Upon entering the 2000s, the present world is beginning to have the possibilities of postmodern global world order.

Yet the world order, showing new changes in actors and activity spheres, shows great disparities among a variety of spatial dimensions.  While Europe, in the twilight of its modern international order, is searching for a postmodern global order in the complexity of actors and activity spheres, Northeast Asia, still in the adolescent stage of adapting to the modern international order, now muddles at the turning point from Cold War to post-Cold War system.

Under these circumstances, to understand the meaning of globalization in South Korea, this study examines the historical development of the Korean globalization in a comparative analysis of the 19th century's internationalization and the 21st century's globalization on the Korean peninsula (Korean Internationalization in the 19th Century).

Until the mid 19th century, mode of life on the Korean peninsula had been constructed under the heavy influence of the Chinese world order. In comparison with the European modern international order, the Chinese traditional world order has three major distinctions. First, while the European modern international order is basically composed of multiple nation-states, the Chinese world order can be considered as a single unit which has a hierarchy of big and small powers.  Second, while the main goal of European nation-states in the modern age was the pursuit of power and wealth for their survival and predominance, the major goal of political actors in the chinese world order was the achievement of rules of proper conduct or propriety which can be summarized as Sadae Chaso (serving the big and taking care of the small).  Third, in comparison with the modern diplomacy system of the European international order, the Chinese world order developed the tributary system for the institutionalization of its foreign relations.

Along with the global expansion of European international order in the 19th century, East Asian countroes were faced with difficulty in responding to the European challenge.  Among these powers in East Asia, Japan was the forerunner in accepting the European modern state-system as a new standard of civilization.

In Europe, the term "civilization" began to be popularized by the French intellectuals of the 18th century for the purpose of showing  pride in their nation for the progress of the West and of mankind.  Yet the traditional Confucian literati in East Asia regarded Europe as the Western "barbarians". In his early writing, "Seiy  Jij  Gaihen" (Conditions in the West, Interlude Part) (1868),  Fukuzawa Yukichi(1835-98),  a leading Japanese scholar of the "civilization and enlightenment" during the Meiji period, began to use the term "Bunmei (bright culture)" for the translation of Western "civilization".  In addition, in his major work, "Bunmeiron no Kairyaku (Outline of a Theory of Civilization)" (1875), which was considerably influenced by Guillaume Guizot's "General History of Civilization in Modern Europe" and Thomas Buckle's "History of Civilization in England", Fukuzawa argued that Japan must import from the West not only "things western" but also the "spirit of civilization" to maintain independence in the face of Western expansion. Based on European theories, Fukuzawa identifies three stages of world civilization: Civilization, semi-civilization and the primitive.  Europe and America are the most civilized, Asian countries, including Turkey, China and Japan, are in the transitional period of semi-civilization, while Africa and Australia are primitive.  Yet he strongly asserts that Japan can also reach the stage of civilization if it makes an effort to speed up the process.

Under the influence of Fukuzawa, Yu Kil-chun (1856-1914), a leading Korean scholar and politician of the "enlightenment" during the late 19th century, used Fukuzawa's translation of "civilization" in his early writing during his academic study in Japan (1981. 5 - 1983. 1).  In his work, "Segye taeseron (On General Trend of the World) (1883), Yu categorizes four stages of the enlightenment:  the barbarian, the primitive, semi-enlightenment, and civilization.  In his view, Europe and the United States can now considered civilized and enlightened countries.  Yet he strongly argues that, as western countries do not yet reach the most advanced stage of the enlightenment, Korea can still have enough chance to achieve the stage of real enlightenment, if it really works hard for the goal.  In his major work, "S yu ky nmun (Observations during a Journey to the West)" (1887-1889), he elaborates much further his view of the enlightenment.

In sum, to cope with a new challenge of western powers in the 19th century, Korea had to adopt the policy of internationalization instead of isolation for the achievement of new standard of civilization.  Under these circumstances, the primary goal of internationalization was to develop a modern state which can continuously pursue power and wealth for its survival of the 19th century.

Tradition and Modernity

In the process of adopting the Western modernity of life as a new standard of civilization in the 19th century, Korea had to face the serious dilemma of tradition and modernity.

As Korea had to pursue the modern project under the heavier burden of tradition than Japan in the 19th century, Yu Kil-chun tried must harder to solve the dilemma of tradition and modernity than Japanese enlightened intellectuals.  In his early writing of "On General Trend of the World", Yu already mentioned cautiously the balance of tradition and modernity.

In his major work, "S yu ky nmun (Observations during a Journey to the West)", Yu explained two different types of enlightenment: the one sterile and the other fruitful.  The former type world slavishly imitates the way of others without first gaining the understanding of the context in which they had developed. The enlightenment would bear fruit, on the other hand, if the operative principles at the root of the material civilization of the West were first perceived and these were then adapted to the reality of one's own count.  In addition, he strongly criticized "the sin of enlightenment" who accepts modernity without tradition, "the enemy of enlightenment", who advocates tradition without modernity and "the invalid of enlightenment" who accepts blindly bad things foreign instead of good things domestic.

From this perspective, Yu tries to suggest a mixed international order based on modern international law and traditional propriety, joint rule of king and people, and harmony of western civilization and confucian ethics.

Discussing the right of state in "S yu ky nmun", Yu introduces the term of internal and external sovereignty based on the modern international law.  He thus explains that while internal sovereignty consists the observance of national constitution by its domestic politics and law, external sovereignty consists in the right to negotiate with foreign states on the basis of independence and equality.  In addition, he elaborates that the state should have basic rights to preserve its own security, to maintain independence, to preserve industry, to make laws, to have diplomatic and commercial relations with foreign countries, to conclude treaties, and to maintain neutrality.

Based on the right of sovereignty, Yu asserts that there is no state higher than another and no state lower than another.  He also admits the possible reality of asymmetrical relations between the powerful and feeble states.  However, as these relations should be understood in the context of tributary relations rather than vassal relations, he explains that feeble states should not be treated as dependent states.  In addition, he strongly argues that both big and small powers should observe modern international law and traditional propriety.

In the case of domestic political system, Yu reviews five different systems of monarchical dictatorship, non-despotic monarchical rule, aristocratic rule, constitutional monarchy and the republican system.  After considering political tradition of Korea, he recommends the joint rule of king and people or constitutional monarchy.

In discussing the stage of enlightenment, Yu mentions that the real enlightenment can be achieved through complex enlightenments of ethics, academics, politics, law, machine, and commodities.  In particular, he clearly argues that the enlightenment of ethics can be achieved by observing traditional Confucian ethics of human relations which has universal value beyond time and space.  On the other hand, he says that harmony of tradition and modernity is absolutely needed for the enlightenment of other spheres.

The Failure of Korean Internationalization

After recognizing the limits of traditional reform based on the Confucian thought to oppose the expansion of western powers in the mid-19th century, the Korean government began to show interest in the Chinese model of internalization, and then the Japanese model of internalization.

Under these circumstances, the Progressive Party attempted the Kapsin coup of 1884 which could last only for three days.  Its failure brought ten years of agony during which reform was not possible.  In this period, Yu Kil-chun wrote his major work, "S yu ky nmun" under the house arrest, and Park y ng-hyo (1861-1939), the son-in-law of king ch'olchong and one of the members of the Progressive Party, submitted a lengthy memorial to King Kojong in 1888 while he was a political exile in Japan.

During the period of Sino-Japanese War(1894-1895), the Korean government once again pursued very ambitiously political, economic, social and cultural reform programs.  Major contents of reform programs can be seen in a document of fourteen articles which was in effect a constitution for the reformed government.  The fourteen articles of the Constitution may be summarized as follows :

  1.  Korea is a sovereign nation completely independent of China.

  2.  The rules of succession to the throne are to be legally determined

  3.  The King alone heads the government, and the Queen and other relatives are excluded from political power.

  4.  The finances and other affairs of the royal family are to be administered separately from those of the government.

  5.  The powers and functions of each official post are to be clearly defined.

  6.  Taxation is to be imposed solely according to law.

  7.  All government financial affairs without exception are to be controlled by the Ministry of Finance.

  8.  The expenses of the various offices are to be reduced.

  9.  Annual budgets are to be prepared to regularize finances.

  10. The functions and jurisdictions of local administration are to be clearly defined by law.

  11. Talented persons are to be sent abroad for study in order to develop and apply modern science and technology

  12. An army is to be established on the basis of conscription.

  13. Reformed civil and criminal law codes are to be enacted.

  14. Appointments to government posts are to be made on the basis of merit only, without regard to social status.

Although the Korean government made belated efforts to pursue the policy of internationalization, it could not successfully survive in the new East Asian international order in the early 20th century.  The primary reason for the failure of Korean internationalization can be seen in the difficulties of overcoming the dilemma of tradition and modernity.  While Japan was relatively peripheral from the center of chinese world order,  Korea was located in the center of Chinese world order. Thus Korea had more troubles in moving from the traditional Chinese world order to the modern European international order.

Second, another major reason for the failure of Korean internationalization could be the breakdown of the balance of power in the region.  After the Sino-Japanese War, the Korean government could not successfully resist the rapidly increasing influence in the region.

Third, the failure of Korean internationalization was also due to the increasing power struggle among political groups on the Korean peninsula.  In this situation, Korean government could not utilize foreign powers for survival.  On the contrary, foreign powers could utilize domestic power struggle of Korea to increase their influence in the region.

Korean Globalization in the 21st Century

Korea faces a  new would order that is beyond the modern international order we have grown accustomed to since the midst of 19th century. For the goals we strive will be based upon a complexity of objectives pursued by the complex state.

This new change in world order, when examined from the perspective of actors, is evident in the following.  One is the decline and dismantling of socialist powers including the Soviet Union. Another, the relative rise of developed capitalist powers such as the U.S., Japan, Germany and so on.  A third is the increased autonomy of regional actors like the E.U.  A fourth, the increased function of international organizations and networks.  The other is the emphasis on the independence of nation and ethnic group.

In addition, from the perspective of activity spheres, one would notice the following.  First, the alleviation trends of international militarization owing to defensive national security and regional security formed from cooperative security efforts.  Second, the enhancement of international economic cooperation and competition.  Third, the priority put on the pursuit of high technology to influence the 21st century productivity.  Fourth, the stress on culture, communication and information has created a new element of national power to go along with military and economic power.  Fifth, the priority on the search to solve the environmental crisis as a major issue in 21 century.  Sixth, the cultivation of high quality human resources through the emphasis on problems of education, old age, and women.  Seventh, the global democratization trends for political resolution of interest conflicts among international actors including nation-States.

Yet Northeast Asia is now experiencing simultaneously the development of modern international order and the beginning of postmodern global order in the region.

From the perspective of actors, the formation and development of Northeast Asian international order, including the Korean peninsula, since World War II, has been practiced in the framework of a three-fold structure that had i) the leadership of the U.S. and Soviet Union, ii) regional roles of Japan and China, and iii) the local roles of a divided Korea.  This three-fold structure is faced with the following changes.

First, The role of superpowers for the Northeast Asian international order will be possibly reduced, Especially, Soviet Union which was one of leading powers in Asia in Cold War era, dismantled in 1991, following the position Russia, which needs much time to build a new economic system after the socialistic economic system and also constantly undergoes internal instability.  Russia, accordingly, is asked to drive the politico-economic reform for a long time at most, and in reality seems to be impossible to perform a superpower role like the Cold War period.

With the Soviet Union disintegration, the United States found itself the sole superpower but in the long term, it is likely that the U.S., too, will find it difficult to maintain its current role as world leader due to problems in domestic politics and economy.  In order to effectively resolve these difficulties, the Clinton adminstration, to which the economy is the number one priority, is pursuing the strategies of engagement and enlargement as basis for its foreign policy.

With such aims, the Clinton administration has drafted the following as part of its framework for post-Cold War Northeast Asian order.  The first is the strengthening of relations with Japan, while also strengthening the regional and global role of Japan, as seen in the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of 1996.  Second, provide support for the adoption of a free market system in China, maintaining only selective engagement during the preceding stage, and drafting appropriate responses to military threats, in effect, forming a tri-layered strategy.  Third, seek the involvement of Russia in drafting measures to increase stability in Northeast Asia.  Fourth, maintain close ties with South Korea for the sake of peace on the Korean Peninsula.  Fifth, implementation of the Geneva Basic Agreement with North Korea, and the commencement of immediate response in the event that North Korea does not comply with the agreement or threatens allied countries.

These efforts on part of the U.S. rises above the 1970s theory on the relative decline of U.S. influence.  At the same time, it has a built-in danger of creating tensions in U.S.-China relations by way of strengthening U.S.-Japan ties.

Second, Japan, now a world economic giant, faces questions on its international role.  Namely, its debate is between the "ordinary country" view that asserts the strengthening of Japan's political and military role, and "global civil power" view where Japan is to contribute to the world by means of non-military way.  Amidst the debate, Japan has cautiously pursued measures for expanding its global role through such as the new "National Defense Program Outline (1995)", "Midterm Defense Program (1996-2000)", "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (1996)", and "Messages for both the citizens of U.S. and Japan (1996)".
Despite such efforts by the Japanese, the view cautiously put forward these days is that of the relative diminishing of Japanese influence, based on evidences as Japan's economic depression in the 1990s, instability in domestic politics, limitations in cultural power, and lack of regional or international leadership.

Third, china that had been the center of East Asian order until the mid-19th century has the possibility to return to that status in the 21st century.  China, from the 1990s onward, have worked to resolve the aftereffects of the Tianenmen Square incident, and seek stability in domestic as well as international politics, in the meanwhile, recording exceptionally high growth.

Effected by such trends, the prospects of china in the 21st century are rather optimistic.  However, if one were to delve deeper into the political and economic realities of China, caution would be the order of the day.  First of all, even though the Chinese economy has been recording double digit growth rates since the early 1990s, the problems of rapid rise of investment in fixed property, rapid inflation, irrational economic structure, uner-performing state-run industries remain large hurdles to maintaining high growth.

In addition, the death of Deng Xiaoping looks to bring about political instability which would, at least in the short run, have a negative impact on the Chinese economy, while in the long run, at the current rate of economic growth, corresponding political reforms will become inevitable, in turn requiring a long period of adjustment from the economy side.

Along with such domestic difficulties, if China-U.S. relations were to take form of conflict rather than cooperation, it would also prove a serious threat to the growth of China's economic capabilities.

Regardless of all the extremity of optimistic outlooks on the Chinese economy, the current growth put on by the 1.2 billion Chinese definitely presents a good argument for China becoming the center of Northeast Asian order in the 21st century.

Along with economic growth, the Chinese have increased military expenditure, strengthened its naval forces, and conducted nuclear tests, prompting the talk of "the Chinese threat" by the U.S. and Japan.  On the other hand, China has historically led its Sino-centric world through its culture rather than military might, thus unlike the case of Japan, if and when China attains both economic and military might, there is the possibility of becoming a stylized regional hegemon.

Fourth, Russia embodies within itself huge economic and military potential but due to the reason of a prolonged economic and political reform period, it will be a long time before Russia will be able to assert its influence.

Fifth, the divided Korea shows two diverging trends in the relative rise in international prominence on part of South Korea, and the relative diminishing of North Korea. Since the breakdown of the Cold War and the socialist states along with it, North Korea has experienced difficulties in maintaining itself because of its loss of international power and weakening of domestic economy.  In order for its own survival, the three tier post-Cold War strategy have been pursued by the North. Namely, the strengthening its grip on domestic activities, raising its international status through improving relations with advanced capitalist countries such as the U.S. and Japan, and maintaining of hostile relations with South Korea.

However, it remains highly doubtful that such survival strategies by North Korea would be able to breath new life into its rule.  The reasons are that in order for advanced capitalist countries to provide assistance and vitalize the North's economy, capitalistic mind-set, business administration, and institutions must be adopted first, and to do that domestic reform is vitally necessary but in the case of North Korea, impossible.  Hence, it looks that the North will be faced with many difficult choices in implementing the Agreed Framework(1994), in resolving disputes over the nuclear issue, with the U.S.  In other words, it would be very hard to expect any rapid strengthening of North Korea's international political or economic status.

On the other hand, South Korea had strengthened its international support by making diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and China, in accordance with the breakdown of the Cold War, and from the mid-1990s onward, is seeking even higher international status through its globalization policies.  On the domestic front, reform in politics, administration, economy, society, and education are in progress.

The South Korean economy, despite its internal difficulties, has grown with consistency to reach the US$ 10,000 GNP per capita plateau.

Sixth, in regards to the creation of an Asia-Pacific regional entity, that would include Northeast Asia, the impetus still remains at the stage of infancy in comparison to Europe or North America, even though discussions and resulting opinions for the necessity of a regional order is growing.

Discussions on regional entities, until the 1980s, have never materialized due to disparities of its prospective members in terms of national power, level of economic development, lack of common interest, and disinterest in economic cooperation.  Nonetheless, come the late 1980s, changes in balance of power, growth in mutual economic interdependence, formulation of communal perceptions, and growth of interest in regional economic cooperation had let to the launching of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989.  However, the future of APEC seem to  hold no more than mere basic cooperation for a long time due to the reasons of the competition among members for power, disparities in level of economic development and cultural heterogeneity.

Seventh, the influence of international networks and organizations on Northeast Asia has grown to be quite visible, particularly in comparison with the past.  In the political and military sphere, one could find the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in action particularly in relation with the North Korean nuclear issue, while in the sphere of international economic order, the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), formed in agreement from the Uruguay Round of GATT, is prominent.

Change in Northeast Asia comes not only in its main actors, themselves, but also their sphere of activities.

First, the Northeast Asian political and military order and recently experienced the dramatic events in the dissemination of the U.S.- Soviet Union confrontation, rapprochement between China and Russia, diplomatic relations between Korea and the two former adversaries in China and Russia, and North Korea seeking improvement of relation with the U.S. and Japan.  Such positive developments were offset by the possibilities and dangers that remain: of China and Japan competing for hegemony amidst uncertainty power, China's military threat, and tension on the Korean Peninsula in face of an unstable North Korean state.
The elements of the Cold War have largely disseminated by what remains of it have within it the seeds for conflict in Northeast Asia's political and military order.  In response, the countries of Northeast Asia have begun to institute measures on the levels of individual countries, bilateralism mostly in conjunction with the United States, and multilateralism.

The Clinton administration, whose United States stands the leading power in Northeast Asian political and military order, has comprehensively reexamined its existing military strategy from the bottom up and established as its basic rule the strategy to be able to respond and win simultaneously to the use of military force in both North Korea and Iraq, both countries whom have the possibility to arouse large scale regional conflicts.  In accordance, the U.S. had decided to maintain for now its 100,000 large troops in the Asia-Pacific, roughly the same as in Europe.

The United States is now in process of calibrating the bilateral security arrangements form the Cold War era to fit that of the post-Cold War era in order to respond effectively to the elements of danger.  Hence, the U.S. is working to expand the Japanese military role as much as they could without alarming the Asian neighbors, and is maintaining its strong military alliance with South Korea in consideration of the stability on the Korean peninsula.  One new aspect shown by the U.S. in the post-Cold War era is its increased interest in a multilateral security system that would increase the possibility of cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific.  However, such an interest faces obstacles due to the reality of individual countries' diverging political and military interests.

While the United States in shaping a new the Northeast Asian Order, China has been steadily strengthening its political and military basis.  Japan, too, has increased its political and military influence in the region in close consultion with the United States, Expanding interest in Asia to an extent unprecedented during the Cold War ear.  While elsewhere countries are experiencing changes of the post-Cold War nature, meanwhile on the Korean Peninsula, Cold War tensions continue to exist and the two Koreas continue to increase their military capabilities as result.

Accordingly, in the absence of an institutional measure in Northeast Asia that would control politically the clashes of interest, countries are increasing their military capabilities.  The result is a less and less clearer picture on what Northeast Asia's political and military order would be. Second, Northeast Asia, or rather the entire Asia-Pacific, economic order has been shaped by the United States, who led the world economic order since the end of World War Ⅱ, and its cooperation as well as competition with Japan, which has also grown to become a great economic power.  Within such a framework, the New Industrialized Economies (NIE's) such as South Korea have continuously achieved high economic growth in the 1960's, to be followed by the ASEAN countries including Thailand and Malaysia, and later China and Vietnam in the 1990s.

Such a stage-after-stage economic growth in East Asia along with the Asia-Pacific economic order have sparked interest in a various new international views where individual countries would come together for regional economic cooperation.  The prime examples would be the plans for a "Pan-East Sea Economic Zone" and "Pan-Yellow Sea Economic Zone," as well as the ASEAN Free Trade Zone, and APEC.

Of course, the success of such regional economic cooperation depend upon the ability to switch over from regional hierarchy, and its inherent economic conflicts, to cooperation.  The next step would be the adjustment and relief of political and military interest and conflicts which are the largest obstacle to regional economic cooperation.  For the long run, the growth of the identity of an Asia-Pacific community is necessary for the economic cooperation in the region.

In the process of Northeast Asian as well as Asian-Pacific economic order, in addition to individual countries of regional economic zones, the world economic order's networks and organizations play an important role as well.  Hence, much of the production, trade, and investment activities in the region have taken place within the confines of the economic order set by global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), founded in 1995.

Third, the cultural order in Northeast Asia has historically been under the influence of the traditional Chinese world order, hence similarities among the countries are prevalent.  It was only from the mid-19th century onwards that the countries in this region have sought after the modern state model by combining existing traditional thoughts, activities, and institutions with those of modern Europe, forming a new order of living.  In the process, the unitary perception of the Sino-centric world order have disappeared and replaced by the strong identifying with one's own nation-states, and this has created much difficulties in forming a Northeast Asian regional order.

While Europe had met the post-Cold War transitions by consolidating the combination of nation-state with regional actors, in Northeast Asia life still revolves around the unit of the nation-state which is overpoweringly prominent over any regional actors.
Therefore, in Northeast Asia, the development of postmodern global order based on the combination of nationalism, regionalism and globalism requires and extensive utilization of information technology to form an identity of community.

Fourth, on the doorstep of the 21st century, Northeast Asian order is beginning to be pursued beyond the conventional objectives of wealth and power, priority given to the utilization of scientific technology, valuing of information, communication, and cultural spheres, environmental issues, upgrading of human resources, and global democratization.

Northeast Asia had adapted the modern European international order only from the mid-19th century onward, and is still pursues interest in terms of the modern state-centered objectives in wealth and power despite its approaching the 21st century.  Concurrently, it is having to deal with early stages of the post-Cold War order.

To cope with challenges of complex changes in the world and Northeast, South Korean government decided to pursue the "Segyehwa (globalization)" policy in late 1994 and established in January 1995 the Committee for the Segyehwa policy with members of government officials, academics, nongovernmental experts as an advisory body for the Segyehwa policy.

To understand correctly the meaning of Segyehwa, it is useful to begin with understanding major difference between the internationalization of the 19th century and the globalization of the 21st century.  While Internationalization can be defined as efforts of the traditional state to catch up with Europe modern state's pursuit of wealth and power as the standard of modern civilization in the 19th century, globalization can be defined as efforts of the modern state to catch up with complex state's pursuit of complex goals as the new standard of postmodern civilization in the 21st century.

To explain Segyehwa policy, South Korean Government sums up the future of Korea in the 21st century as a unified Korea which plays a pivotal role in world affairs as a respectable power.  In sum, the goal of Segyehwa policy is not to pursue a model of economically wealthy and militarily strong country in the 19th century, but a model of the complex state with postmodern complex goals in the 21st century.

In addition, the South Korean government elaborates more specific steps to promote "Segyehwa".  First, education must be geared toward globalization.  For this purpose, the present education system should be reformed to produce a sufficient number of creative and enterprising young citizens with a 21st century's vision.  In parallel, families, schools, and society should make joint efforts to create a global citizen of the 21st century through life-long education.

Second, legal and economic systems must be reformed to meet the global standards of excellent rule of law, and good citizenship should prevail in a new legal system.  The legal profession should also be reformed with the rationalization of its customs and practices.  All economic transactions must be done in a free and transparent way, and fair business competition must be ensured.  Financial institutions need to be more competitive, and the tax system must be revised in a fair way.  In addition, the labor management relation should be improved with adequate social security system.

Third, politics and news media must also be geared toward globalization.  Political parties must compete for policy alternative, and cultivate democracy within their parties and nurture a new political leader.  Politicians should make their efforts for enhancing social coherence, especially by further developing expertise in specific areas of public issues and more efficiently representing various interests of society.  The efficiency of the National Assembly should be substantially improved.  The news media should also be reformed as a truly public institution.

Fourth, national and local governments should be reformed to meet the global standard of efficiency.  A small but efficient government can be developed through drastic dereguation.  In providing public services, public administration must become efficient as much as well-managed business companies.  At the same time, the autonomy of local governments must be fully pursued so that local communities can maximize their full potential to cope with the challenges of globalization.
Fifth, South Korea must actively take part in the global efforts to maintain the ecological balance. Every governmental and non-governmental actors should work together to build an environment-friendly community.

Finally, Korea should march toward the world on the basis of its unique culture and traditional values.  Open-Koreanization should be a starting point for the globalization of Korea.  In a long-term perspective, the complex culture should be developed with the harmony among global regional, national, and local cultures.

In parallel with developing such kind of policy agenda of Korean globalization by the government, the Committee for the Segyehwa policy has pursued almost 20 major projects of globalization since 1995.  30% of these projects are closely related with the globalization of the Korean economy, and another 20% of these projects can be grouped under the title of "Korea in the World".  And the rest of projects deal with  administrative reform, the quality of life, the reform of legal service, the problem of women, and young generation, and cultural issues.

Modernity and Postmodernity

There are now increasing criticisms that Segyehwa has become a political slogan rather than a serious policy goal.  We can rather easily find out the following major reasons for this legitimate criticism : the lack of Sufficient domestic preparation for the Segyehwa policy in terms of perspective and leadership, the modern nature of the Northeast Asian international order, and the unfinished modern project of unification.

First, in spite of rather strong efforts to pursue Segyehwa policy, there has been a lack of increasing consensus on the Korean globalization not only among politicians and government officials, but also among intellectuals and news media.  There have been at least 4 different interpretation of the Korean globalization from the perspectives of globalization as modernization, subordination, postmodernization, and complexification.

At the beginning stage of the Segyehwa policy, there was an effort to interpret globalization as complexification.  However, as the South Korean government tried to pursue a more active Segyehwa policy, the interpretation of globalization as modernization gained their strength.  In addition, the interpretation of globalization as subordination or postmodernization raised up their voice as a minority opinion.  Under these circumstances, as there was no strong political leadership who can support the interpretation of globalization as complexification, the 19th century's interpretation of globalization as modernization rather easily superceded the 21st century's interpretation of globalization as complexification.

Second, in contrast to Europe which is now trying to develop the postmodern type of regional order including the European Union after the end of the Cold War, Northeast Asian countries still make full efforts to achieve modern projects related with the European model of wealth and power.  Yet they are based on at the beginning stage of pursuing postmodern projects such as cooperative security, information society, complex culture, ecological balance, and the development of human capital resources.

Under these circumstances, it may be natural from a short-term perspective that the South Korean government had to pursue primarily the 19th century's type of internationalization, and subordinately the 21st century's type of globalization.

Third, the division of Korea has given another major negative impact on the implementation of the Segyehwa policy.
Hostility between  two Koreas has a long history.  The inter-Korean relations were characterized by hostility from the beginning, as the two Koreas refused to recognize each other's legitimacy.  The DPRK, since it was established in 1948, used military warfares as its primary policy tools and political warfares as the secondary policy tools against South Korea.

In the 1960s, however, as this policy failed, the North reversed their order of importance and deployed political warfares as its primary policy tools and military warfares as the secondary tools.  Subsequently, the North proclaimed that it would resolve the conflicts between  two Koreas through a people's democratic revolution for national liberation by strengthening the revolutionary capabilities in the three spheres-North Korea, South Korea, and the entire world-and tried its best to carry out such plans.

Since the mid 1980s, however, with the rapid collapse of the socialist bloc, North Korea lost its international supporters and thus experienced serious economic difficulties.  As a result, North Korea is now in search of a three-fold post-Cold War survival strategy to preserve its regime.  It first wants to strengthen its domestic revolutionary capabilities, building it on the basis of force and ideology.  At the same time, North Korea wishes to improve its external relations with advanced capitalist countries including the United States and Japan in order to reinforce its international revolutionary capabilities, which have been debilitated by the disintegration of the Soviet Empire.

Nonetheless, North Korea's hostile policy toward South Korea remains unchanged as it was proved in the recent submarine infiltration incident.  This demonstrates dual aspects of North Korea's united front strategy : the North is taking a double stance of simultaneously pursuing peace and war in its policy toward South Korea.

North Korea proceeded the nuclear talks with the United States in the mid 1990s within the framework of this new survival strategy.  Pyongyang's top priority in the negotiation was to strengthen its domestic revolutionary capabilities.  It then worked hard to establish economic, political and military ties with the U.S. in return for freezing its present and future nuclear activities.  Finally, it tries its best to minimize the role of South Korea in the process of resolving the nuclear issue.

Unless North Korea abandons its present unification policy which is based on the united front strategy, two Koreas can hardly take the first step toward the establishment of the peace regime on the Korean peninsula.  As long as the North holds military reasoning rather than political reasoning in building a relationship with the political leadership of the South, two Koreas can never be able to achieve a peaceful unification, which requires the mutual recognition of each other's existence.

Only when Pyongyang finally begins to realize that it would not be able to achieve too much through strengthening its revolutionary capabilities by improving its relations with advanced capitalist countries, it is likely to alter the three-fold Post-Cold War survival strategy.  The North then will be placed in a situation where its leadership has to choose between helplessly watching the situation getting worse and improving relations with the South.  As the situation in North Korea reaches an extreme point, an opportunity for the improvement of intra-Korean relations will become available.

As long as the dilemma of unification on the Korean peninsula will not be peacefully solved, South Korea cannot make full efforts to pursue its Segyehwa policy.

The Future of Korean Globalization

Since the mid- 19th century, traditional Korea which was under the heavy influence of the Chinese World Order, began to adopt the Western modern state system via Japan.  However, this effort could not be successful due to Japan's annexation of Korea.  During the Japanese colonial period, Korea could not continuously pursue its modern projects.  After the liberation from the Japanese imperialism in 1945, divided Korea resumed its efforts to develop political, military, economic, social, and cultural bases for the modern state in the Cold War international system.

During the last half of the century, South Korea has continuously tried to catch up with the standard of modern civilization.  As a result, it has rather successfully emerged as a middle power and also enhanced its relative position in Northeast Asia.  However, it is also true that, as South Korea had to develop its own form of the modern state in a very short period of time, it is still suffering from the historical legacy of the premodern and colonial period.

Under these circumstances, to achieve a successful globalization of Korea, it has to pursue modern and postmodern projects at the same time.  It means that South Korea should simultaneously pursue global and Asian symbiotic order based on the open-Asian identity, postmodern type of national unification, and also modern and postmodern domestic reform.