The history of modern times between Korea and Japan consists of many tragedies. And now, as we contemplate prospects for a new civilization in the 21st century, both countries face the task of answering to history's call, that is, to prepare themselves for new relations amongst themselves, with Asia, and the world. To start anew relations between Korea and Japan, it is crucial to have as a preceding condition a new historical imaginativeness that transcend above the rather flawed relationship between the two countries in the modern era. Hence, it is our objective to look back and observe the issue of past Korea-Japan relations, albeit with a future-oriented twist that is in contrast to the many other studies done on the subject. First, in order to illuminate the Korea-Japan relationship, we must examine how the possibility of a new civilization in the 21st century, with complex changes in basic life units and activity spheres, are proceeding particularly in East Asia. Within the spatio-temporal framework, Korea and Japan must examine ways to establish contacts in the new complex activity spheres of complex actors that go beyond competing to enrich and strengthen modern states. Second, to step up the future-oriented contact between Korea-Japan, it is necessary to go to an extreme in looking back on what went wrong in the modern contact between two countries. For that purpose, we must have a comprehensive examination of several disputes such as the "passiveness on the Japanese penetration of Korea", "legitimization on the Japanese annexation of Korea" and "positive evaluation on the Japanese colonial rule" and link the flawed modern state-formation process of Japan with the failure of Chosun's modern state-formation process.

Third, both Germany in Europe, and Japan in Asia, following the end of World War II, were met with different domestic and international environments, subsequently leading to different processes of rebuilding. While Germany was able to make peace with the damaged countries, Japan has not been able to do so with its Asian neighbors, and it has been an obstacle to forming a future-oriented contact between Korea-Japan. Fourth, the flawed modern contact between Korea and Japan was not given time to reformulate during the post-war era, and was to immediately undergo new changes within the framework of the Northeast Asian Cold-War system constructed around the U.S.-Soviet Union relationship. Korea-Japan were to rise above domestic problems and meet each other in a new modern context, albeit this time under the leadership of the U.S. There were both positives and negatives in the improvements of political and economical relationship between Korea and Japan during that time.

Politically, amidst repetitions of troublesome statements, apologies were officially produced. Economically, there is a definite possibility of change, from the "wild geese" vertical structure of labour division to a relative "scattering sparrows" horizontal division . Finally, the Korea-Japan relations formed during the Cold War era faces chances for renewed contact now that the post-Cold War era has brought about many changes. The Korea-Japan relationship within the structure of post-Cold War is no longer the contact for only inter-governmental enrichment and strengthening, but is destined to include contact of complex actors including civil-society in complex activity spheres. In facing such prospects for change in the near future, the task of overcoming the flaws of the past and creating a new era of Korea-Japan relations requires a historical perspective in investigating the five points mentioned above. The project-researchers in Korea have concluded that is preferable to proceed with the tasks as a joint project with the Japanese rather than as a unilateral Korean initiative. Hence, we were able to enlist help from both Korea and Japan, owing to the coordination of Dr. Lee Won-deog and Professor Kimiya Tadashi. Since the massive task in examining the Korea-Japan relationship with a future-oriented view was conducted by a small number of researchers in very short time, it was our hope to give ample time afterwards to revise and supplement the research outcomes, and then publish the results as a book. Despite the importance of a new relation between Korea and Japan at the dawn of the 21st century, in reality, discussions on this issue never got past the stage of political propaganda. We concluded, therefore, to publish the results of our study, as mid-term report that despite its shortcomings would become at least a fore stage in making the ultimate accomplishment in forming a future-oriented relation between Korea and Japan. Sincere contributions from all over were instrumental in completing this project. To begin with, it was only through the financial support by the Korea Press Center.

The Center For International Studies at Seoul National University had sponsored the project in spite of and amidst the complicated nature of our joint-study of Korea-Japan relations. I am obliged to express my most sincere appreciation to the researchers in Korea and Japan for accepting earnestly the somewhat difficult task in submitting valuable works on a massive theme within so little time. In addition, from the beginning of the researcher project to the accomplishment of a book I thank Dr. Lee Won-Deog of the Sejong Institute whose sacrifice and hard work made this volume possible. Chap. 1 Postmodern Global Order and the Future of Korea-Japan Relationship The history of contact between Korea and Japan go back to ancient times. It was only since the mid 19th century that Korea-Japan relations had made turns for the ugly, culminating in the Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula. However, the ending of World War II had brought independence to Korea in 1945, and during the half century since, the two countries have worked toward a new modern contact that would rise above the flawed one of past. Despite the efforts by both Korea and Japan, the tragedies of past have yet to be satisfactorily dealt with, and with common views toward reconciliation still in the works, a new contact between the two countries are ever more necessary, especially in meeting the challenges of evolving world order. 1. Change Toward a New Civilization in the 21st Century Korea and Japan face a new world order that is beyond the modern international order we have grown accustomed to since the midst of 19th century, for the goals we strive will be based upon a complexity of objectives pursued by the complex state. The existing modern states will bear in mind the relative autonomy of regional actors, international organizations and networks, and also will be compiled together with the relative autonomy of local actors and organizations of civil society. At the same time, the goals of activities that these complex states will pursue will be a complex of pacification, prosperity, high technology, complex global civilization, ecological balance, cultivation of higher human capital, global democratization in addition to the traditional wealth and power of the nation. In regard to Korea-Japan relations, at this particular turning point in the history of civilization, to simply bury the flawed past and search for a better way of modern contact between Korea-Japan is not enough. What is needed is a postmodern contact between the two that would open up a brand new chapter based upon shared identity of Asia. This research, in order to form a framework of new contact between Korea and Japan within the frame of postmodern global order, must first recognize the nature of postmodern globalization, that is emerging as a new standard of 21 century new civilization, then examine how to mix the Korea-Japan contact at the level of both actors and activity spheres. We are, at the dawn of 21 century, faced with a new world order amidst the swirl of revolutionary change. The Cold War world order built around the U.S. and Soviet Union in the center had been from the end of World War II until the mid 1980s was superseded by post-Cold War history owing to the swift decline of Soviet Union since. Upon entering the 1990s, the present world is emerging out of the dark history of Cold War age to meet the possibilities of new world order. This new change in world order, when examined from the perspective of actors, is evident in the following. One is the decline and dismantling of socialist powers including the Soviet Union. Another, the relative rise of developed capitalist powers such as the U.S., Japan, Germany and so on. A third is the increased autonomy of regional actors like the E.U. A fourth, the increased function of international organizations and networks.

The other is the emphasis on the independence of nation and ethnic group. In addition, from the perspective of activity spheres, one would notice the following. First, the alleviation trends of international militarization owing to defensive national security and regional security formed from cooperative security efforts. Second, the enhancement of international economic cooperation and competition. Third, the priority put on the pursuit of high technology to influence the 21st century productivity. Fourth, the stress on culture, communication and information has created a new element of national power to go along with military and economic power. Fifth, the priority on the search to solve the environmental crisis as a major issue in 21 century. Sixth, the cultivation of high quality human resources through the emphasis on problems of education, old age, and women. Seventh, the global democratization trends for political resolution of interest conflicts among international actors including nation-states. Yet the world order, showing new changes in actors and activity spheres, shows great disparities among a variety of spatial dimensions. While Europe, in the twilight of its modern international order, is searching for a postmodern global order in the complexity of actors and activity spheres, Northeast Asia, still in the adolescent stage of adapting to the mid-19th century modern international order, now muddles at the turning point from Cold War to post-Cold War system. 2. Nartheast Asian Change in Actors in the 21st Century The formation and development of northeast Asian international order, including the Korean peninsula, since World War II, has been practiced in the framework of a three-fold structure that had i) the leadership of the U.S. and Soviet Union, ii) regional roles of Japan and China, and iii) the local roles of a divided Korea. This three-fold structure is faced with the following changes. First, The role of superpowers for the Northeast Asian international order will be possibly reduced.

Especially, Soviet Union which was one of leading powers in Asia in Cold War era, dismantled in 1991, following the position Russia, which needs much time to build a new economic system after socialistic economic system and also constantly undergoes internal instability. Russia, accordingly, is asked to drive the politico-economical reform for a long time at most, and in reality seems to be impossible to perform a superpower role like in Cold War period. With the Soviet Union disintegrating, the United States found itself the sole surviving superpower but in the long term, it is likely that the U.S., too, will find it difficult to maintain its current role as world leader due to problems in domestic politics and economy. In order to effectively resolve these difficulties, the Clinton administration, to which the economy is the number one priority, is pursuing the strategies of engagement and enlargement as basis for its foreign policy. The application of such strategy can be seen in the United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region of 1995 put out by the U.S. Department of Defense, which stresses the strengthening of engagement with old allies and friends as Japan, Korea, Australia, ASEAN, New Zealand, and the Pacific Islands, in addition to an enlargement policy supporting reforms toward free markets in socialist countries as China, Russia, and Vietnam. The report also sites issues as the search for multilateral security measures, implementation of the Geneva Basic Agreement, resolution of long-term regional issues as North Korea, Cambodia and Taiwan, as well as the nonproliferation and nonuse of missiles and weapons of mass destruction. With such aims, the Clinton administration has drafted the following as part of its framework for post-Cold War Northeast Asian order. First is the strengthening of relations with Japan, while also strengthening the regional and global role of Japan, as seen in the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security of 1996. Second, provide support for the adoption of a free market system in China, maintaining only selective engagement during the preceding stage, and drafting appropriate responses to military threats, in effect, forming a tri-layered strategy. Third, seek the involvement of Russia in drafting measures to increase stability in Northeast Asia. Fourth, maintain close ties with South Korea for the sake of peace on the Korean Peninsula. Fifth, implementation of the Geneva Basic Agreement with North Korea, and the commencement of immediate response in the event that North Korea does not comply with the agreement or threatens allied countries. These efforts on part of the U.S. rises above the 1970s theory on the relative diminishing of U.S. influence, by presenting, rather, a relative resurrection of U.S. influence. At the same time, it has a built-in danger of creating tensions in U.S.-China relations by way of strengthening U.S.-Japan ties. Second, Japan, now a world economic giant, faces questions on its international role. Namely, its debate is between the "ordinary country" view that asserts the strengthening of Japan's political and military role, and "global civil power" view where Japan is to contribute to the world by means of non-military ways. Amidst the debate, Japan has cautiously pursued measures for expanding its global role through such as the new "National Defense Program Outline (1995)", "Midterm Defense Program (1996-2000)", "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security (1996)", and "Messages for both the citizens of U.S. and Japan (1996)". Despite such efforts by the Japanese, the view cautiously put forward these days is that of the relative diminishing of Japanese influence, based on evidences as Japan's economic depression in the 1990s, instability in domestic politics, limitations in cultural power, and lack of regional or international leadership. Third, China that had been the center of East Asian order until the mid-19th century has the possibility to return to that status in the 21st century. China, from the 1990s onward, have worked to resolve the aftereffects of the Tianenmen Square incident, and seek stability in domestic as well as international politics, in the meanwhile, recording exceptionally high growth. Effected by such trends, the prospects of China in the 21st century are rather optimistic. However, if one were to delve deeper into the political and economic realities of China, caution would be the order of the day. First of all, even though the Chinese economy has been recording double digit growth rates since the early 1990s, the problems of rapid rise of investment in fixed property, rapid inflation, irrational economic structure, under-performing state-run industries remain large hurdles to maintaining high growth. In addition, the death of Deng Xiaopeng looks to bring about political instability which would, at least in the short run, have a negative impact on the Chinese economy, while in the long run, at the current rate of economic growth, corresponding political reforms will become inevitable, in turn requiring a long period of adjustment from the economy side. Along with such domestic difficulties, if China-U.S. relations were to take form of conflict rather than cooperation, it would also prove a serious threat to the growth of China's economic capabilities.

Regardless of all the extremity of optimistic outlooks on the Chinese economy, the current growth put on by the 1.2 billion Chinese definitely presents a good argument for China becoming the center of Northeast Asian order in the 21st century. Along with economic growth, the Chinese have increased military expenditure, strengthened its naval forces, and conducted nuclear tests, prompting the talk of "the Chinese threat" by the U.S. and Japan. On the other hand, China has historically led its Sino-centric world order through its culture rather than military might, thus unlike the case of Japan, if and when China attains both economic and military might, there is the possibility of it becoming a stylized regional hegemon. Fourth, Russia embodies within itself huge economic and military potential but due to the reason of a prolonged economic and political reform period, it will be a long time before Russia will be able to assert its influence. Fifth, the divided Korea shows two diverging trends in the relative rise in international prominence on part of South Korea, and the relative diminishing of North Korea. Since the breakdown of the Cold War and the socialist states along with it, North Korea has experienced difficulties in maintaining itself because of its loss of international power and weakening of domestic economy. In order for its own survival, the three tier post-Cold War strategy have been pursued by the North. Namely, the strengthening its grip on domestic activities, raising its international status through improving relations with advanced capitalist countries as the U.S. or Japan, and maintaining of hostile relations with South Korea.

However, it remains highly doubtful that such survival strategies by North Korea would be able to breath new life into its rule. The reasons are that in order for advanced capitalist countries to provide assistance and vitalize the North's economy, capitalistic mind-set, business administration, and institutions must be adopted first, and to do that domestic reform is vitally necessary but in the case of North Korea, impossible. Hence, it looks that the North will be faced with many difficult choices in implementing the Basic Agreement, in resolving disputes over the nuclear issue, with the U.S. In other words, it would be very hard to expect any rapid strengthening of North Korea's international political or economic status. On the other hand, South Korea had strengthened its international support by making diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and China, in accordance with the breakdown of the Cold War, and from the mid-1990s onward, is seeking even higher international status through its globalization policies. On the domestic front, reform in politics, administration, economy, society, and education are in progress. The South Korean economy, despite its internal difficulties, has grown with consistency to reach the US$ 10,000 GNP per capita plateau. Sixth, in regards to the creation of an Asia-Pacific regional entity, that would include Northeast Asia, the impetus still remains at the stage of infancy in comparison to Europe or North America, even though discussions and resulting opinions for the necessity of a regional order is growing. Discussions on regional entities, until the 1980s, have never materialized due to disparities of its prospective members in terms of national power, level of economic development, lack of common interest, and disinterest in economic cooperation. Nonetheless, come the late 1980s, changes in balance of power, growth in mutual economic interdependence, formulation of communal perceptions, and growth of interest in regional economic cooperation had led to the launching of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in 1989. However, the future of APEC seem to hold no more than mere basic cooperation for a long time due to the reasons of the competition among members for power, disparities in level of economic development and cultural heterogeneity. Seventh, the influence of international networks and organizations on Northeast Asia has grown to be quite visible, particularly in comparison with the past. In the political and military sphere, one could find the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in action particularly in relation with the North Korean nuclear issue, while in the sphere of international economic order, the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), formed in agreement from the Uruguay Round of GATT, is prominent. 3. Northeast Asian Change in Sphere of Activities in the 21st Century Change in Northeast Asia comes not only in its main actors, themselves, but also their sphere of activities. First, the Northeast Asian political and military order had recently experienced the dramatic events in the disseminating of the U.S.-Soviet Union confrontation, rapprochement between China and Russia, diplomatic relations between Korea and the two former adversaries in China and Russia, and North Korea seeking improvement of relations with the U.S. and Japan. Such positive developments were offset by the possibilities and dangers that remain: of China and Japan competing for hegemony amidst uncertainty about the U.S.' role in the region, dangers of Japan's becoming a military power, China's military threat, and tension on the Korean Peninsula in face of an unstable North Korean state. The elements of the Cold War have largely disseminated but what remains of it have within it the seeds for conflict in Northeast Asia's political and military order. In response, the countries of Northeast Asia have begun to institute measures on the levels of individual countries, bilateralism mostly in conjunction with the United States, and multilateralism. The Clinton administration, whose United States stands the leading power in Northeast Asian political and military order, has comprehensively reexamined its existing military strategy from the bottom up and established as its basic rule the strategy to be able to respond and win simultaneously to the use of military force in both North Korea and Iraq, both countries whom have the possibility to arouse large scale regional conflicts. In accordance, the U.S. had decided to maintain for now its 100,000 large troops in the Asia-Pacific, roughly the same as in Europe. The United States is now in process of calibrating the bilateral security arrangements from the Cold War era to fit that of the post-Cold War era in order to respond effectively to the elements of danger. Hence, the U.S. is working to expand the Japanese military role as much as they could without alarming the Asian neighbors, and is maintaining its strong military alliance with South Korea in consideration of the stability on the Korean peninsula. One new aspect shown by the U.S. in the post-Cold War era is its increased interest in a multilateral security system that would increase the possibility of cooperative security in the Asia-Pacific. However, such an interest faces obstacles due to the reality of individual countries' diverging political and military interests. While the United States is shaping anew the Northeast Asian order, China has been steadily strengthening its political and military basis. Japan, too, has increased its political and military influence in the region in close consultation with the United States, expanding interest in Asia to an extent unprecedented during the Cold War era. While elsewhere countries are experiencing changes of the post-Cold War nature, meanwhile on the Korean Peninsula, Cold War tensions continue to exist and the two Koreas continue to increase their military capabilities as result. Accordingly, in the absense of an institutional measure in Northeast Asia that would control politically the clashes of interest, countries are increasing their military capabilities. The result is a less and less clearer picture on what Northeast Asia's political and military order would be. Second, Northeast Asia, or rather the entire Asia-Pacific, economic order has been shaped by the United States, who led the world economic order since the end of World War II, and its cooperation as well as competition with Japan, which has also grown to become a great economic power. Within such a framework, the New Industrialized Economies (NIE's) such as South Korea have continuously achieved high economic growth in the 1960s, to be followed by the ASEAN countries including Thailand and Malaysia, and later China and Vietnam in the 1990s.

Such a stage-after-stage economic growth in East Asia along with the Asia-Pacific economic order have sparked interest in a various new international views where individual countries would come together for regional economic cooperation. The prime examples would be the plans for a "Pan-East Sea Economic Zone" and "Pan-Yellow Sea Economic Zone, " as well as the ASEAN Free Trade Zone, and APEC. Of course, the success of such regional economic cooperation depend upon the ability to switch over from regional hierarchy, and its inherent economic conflicts, to cooperation. The next step would be the adjustment and relief of political and military interests and conflicts which are the largest obstacle to regional economic cooperation. For the long run, the growth of the identity of an Asia-Pacific community is necessarg for the economic cooperation in the region. In the process of Northeast Asian as well as Asia-Pacific economic order, in addition to individual countries or regional economic zones, the world eocnomic order's networks and organizations play an important role as well. Hence, much of the production, trade, and investment activities in the region have taken place within the confines of the economic order set by global organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), founded in 1995. Third, the cultural order in Northeast Asia has historically been under the influence of the traditional Chinese world order, hence similarities among the countries are prevalent.

It was only from the mid-19th century onwards that the countries in this region have sought after the modern state model by combining existing traditional thoughts, activities, and institutions with those of modern Europe, forming a new order of living. In the process, the unitary perception of the Sino-centric world order have disappeared and replaced by the strong identifying with one's own nation-states, and this has created much difficulties in forming a Northeast Asian regional order. While Europe had met the post-Cold War transitions by consolidating the combination of nation-state with regional actors, in Northeast Asia life still revolves around the unit of the nation-state which is overpoweringly prominent over any regional actors. Therefore, in Northeast Asia, the development of postmodern global order based on the combination of nationalism regionalism and globalism requires an extensive utilization of information technology to form an identity of community. Fourth, on the doorstep of the 21st century, Northeast Asian order is beginning to be pursued beyond the conventional objectives of wealth and power, priority given to the utilization of scientific technology, valuing of information, communication, and cultural spheres, environmental issues, upgrading of human resources, and global democratization. A good example of such postmodern activity is the cooperation among Northeast Asian members that looks to materialize on the issues of air and sea pollution, an inevitable byproduct of industrialization of the 19th century, which looks to become one of the largest problems in the coming century. Efforts toward the regional resolution of such problems of the 21st century will realize only in close relation to the political, military, economic, and cultural orders. Amidst these changes in the units and sphere of activities in Northeast Asia in preparation for the 21st century, in order for the countries to truly prosper, oligarchic orders led by either the United States, U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Japan-China, or Japan-China must be avoided in favor of an order of symbiosis, based on collective leadership of all the political actors in the region. Northeast Asia had adapted the modern European international order only from the mid-19th century onward, and is still pursues interest in terms of the modern state-centered objectives in wealth and power despite its approaching the 21st century.

Concurrently, it is having to deal with early stages of the post-Cold War order. The dual structure under which Northeast Asian order is to be found is all the more impetus for a new contact between Korea and Japan. 4. Postmodern Meeting Between Korea and Japan In order to examine, in a future-oriented light, the history of contact between Korea and Japan, it is useful to divide into three periods, pre-modern, modern, and postmodern of history. In the pre-modern period, both Korea and Japan were on the periphery of the Sino-centric world order, and had regarded each other mutually with a sense of superiority. Korea, closer geographically and culturally to the center in China, had always considered themselves superior to Japanese in terms of its history and culture, while Japan, located further on the periphery than Korea, had their own version of superiority from having a clear self identity derived from the freedom to develop self-respect. In the mid-19th century, Northeast Asia had no choice but to accept the modern international order. Japan, unlike Chosun or the Ching Dynasty, had walked the road of cultural openness incorporating European culture which was considered barbaric within the traditonal Sino-centric order. Japan had superimposed European culture upon that of the historical view of Emperor's state formed in the traditional Japanese order.

Soon Japan had pursued policies of enrichment and strength of the one country Japan, and exerted influence over Korea through the Sino-Japanese War and Russo-Japanese War, and soon after, colonial rule of Korea. Korea, despite the calls by a few for colonial modernization, had experienced much hardship and failures in its process of modernization. The period of colonial rule finally ended with the Japanese loss of World War II. Amidst the United States efforts to find world order against the Soveit Union led world socialist system in the post-World War II era, Korea and Japan had once again had the opportunity to meet. However, because of the flawed initial meeting in the early 20th century, it was apparent that normalization of diplomatic relations in the 1960s have not completely resolved the feelings of the 19th century. Within Northeast Asia's change toward the 21st century, in order for Korea-Japan relations to unload the historical feelings off its back, the flawed contact of past must be truly dealt with, and efforts should be made for a postmodern meeting for the 21st century. If the modern contact was state-centric and closed-door, the postmodern one should be one of complex contacts by complex units. For such to materialize, it is crucial that both Korea and Japan be transformed from modern countries to complex ones. To have complexlevels in the modern country, the m odern state, that is the central unit, must make efforts to incorporate externally global and regional networks and organizations, while domestically do the same for local actors, social interest groups, and individuals. Such a change from the traditionally state-centered approach between the two countries will bring about a 5-dimensional nature consisting of the world, region, state, local and social organizations, and individual. Such a process of complexification requires the following. First, a balance of power alternative to prevent the state-centeredness of the modern country since interstate contacts outweigh enormously any other area of contact. Second, regionalization is crucial in incorporating the state-centered formation of identity into the regional context. Third, the state-centered nature of Korea-Japan relations should be changed through contacts by the various other domestic units within the two countries. Efforts for finding sphere of activities in a new complex cooperation between Korea and Japan, that rises above the modern pursuits of wealth and power and opts for future orientation, is in fact providing a 21st century order for symbiosis. Hence, it is recommended that the emerging standards for the 21st century in peace, prosperity, high technology, information, society complexculturalism, eco-balance, refinement of human resources, and democratization be realized in Northeast Asia. The political and military order of the 21st century, with its possible competition for hegemony on part of the United States and China, has within the possible dangers of "decling role of the U.S.", "threat of China", "the great power of Japan", and "the collapse of North Korea." In consideration of such, Korea and Japan must work together for the attainment of Northeast Asian peace system of the 21st century. To do so requires, improvement of North Korea-South Korea relations as well as North Korea-United States and North Korea-Japan relations, while China and Japan should have the political trust of its neighboring countries that would lead to military confidence and disarmament. The common objective of Korea and Japan should be peace and prosperity in an open East Asia. This requires the role of the leader of East Asian economy in Japan. Once Japan rises above its Japan-centric welath and power policy and opt for not "the Japanization of Asia" but "Asianization of Japan" Korea will be able to cooperate and work towards that common goal. High technology is being touted as the source of power in the new civilization of the 21st century. For East Asia, attainment of technology would require a transition of Korea-Japan technological cooperation order from the vertical hierarchical structure to a mutually reinforcing horizontal one while concurrently, having that order contribute to global cooperation and competition. Information in the 21st century is comparable in importance to industrialization of the 19th century. The information age is proceeding at fast pace. Hence, the Korea-Japan cooperation for the 21st century should aim for the development of information-based East Asian countries as well as information-based region, and the link of information between East Asia and the rest of the world. Such an effort would ultimately contribute to the resolution of conflict among modern units and creation of complex identities. Because Korea-Japan relations have had an unfortunate past, what is needed, more than in relations with any other country, is a successful resolution to the cultural conflicts. The lives of Koreans and Japanese, within the traditional order, have been tainted with notions of superiority over the other, and in the process of modern state formation Korea had been subject to Japanese colonialization, after which two countries experienced the end of World War II and subsequent Americanization. Within such, both Korea and Japan have had until now interactions of changing cultures. In order that the cultural conflict formed during the past be resolved in a 21st century manner, a complex culture with common traits must be superimposed atop the individual one, which in turn should further create a complex culture of Asia. The issue that is most urgent yet full of good prospects for cooperation between Korea and Japan is the environment, or eco-balance. The levels of economic development among the countries of Northeast Asia are all different, and political as well as military tensions over interest still prevail in the post-Cold War era. In addition, despite cultural heterogeneities, the area of the environment is one where bilateral, as well as regional, cooperation is most probable and require much efforts on part of Korea and Japan. In particular, the financial backing on part of Japan is crucial. The cultivation of human resources has become a standard for the new civilization of the 21st century, and it is accepted that can no longer be confined to state-centric education, senior citizens' welfare, and development of female resources. Hence, Korea and Japan must strengthen mutual cooperation toward developing human resources amongst themselves as well as in East Asia. The basis for a symbiotic order in Asia should be that coming from peaceful solutions, as opposed to military ones, to tensions arising amidst complex entities pursuing complex objectives. Such would require pursuits, simultaneously, of democracy that incorporate human rights and local self-rule, regional democracy that make collective leadership by its member entities possible, and democracy on a global scale. Hence, Korea-Japan cooperation for symbiosis Asia should simultaneously be pursued alongside global democracy. Such new efforts on part of Korea and Japan would rise above the pre-modern notions of superiority or modern tensions, and form renewed relations between the two that is based on the postmodern notion of symbiosis. Further, such renewed relations would serve as basis for symbiotic order in Asia.