After the Berlin Agreement and the Perry report in the autumn of 1999, there are two opposing views in South Korea on the future of North Korean nuclear/missile crisis. Optimistic North Korea watchers strongly argue that the new situation is a prelude to the dismantlement of cold-war system on the Korean peninsula. On the other hand, pessimistic North Korea watchers disputed that the current situation is only an interlude between two crises on the peninsula.

Since the beginning of the 1990s, there have been three major cycles of crisis in Korea. The first crisis of Yongbyon was originated from the dispute of  IAEA's inspection on North Korea's clandestine nuclear facilities. Avoiding successfully the high risk of military confrontation, the United States and North Korea could finally reached the Agreed Framework in Geneva in October, 1994. The second crisis of Kumchangri began with the suspicion over the construction of underground facilities. This crisis could be solved in March, 1999 through the agreement between the United States and North Korea in New York. However, contrary to the expectation of easing tension in the region, after the New York agreement, there were naval clashes between two Koreas in the West Sea, and also detention of a South Korean tourist for Kumgang mountain. The third crisis of Taepodong initiated from North Korea's preparation for the test-fire of long-range missile. This crisis was surmounted in September, 1999 by the Berlin Agreement. In addition, the Perry report was finally released as a road map for Washington's new North Korea policy. [1]

In spite of dismantling the cold-war over the world, the Korean peninsula has continuously experienced the cycles of crisis and are facing once more the crossroad of crisis and peace. During the cold-war period, the Korean crises are developed by complex factors of global competition of the United States and the Soviet Union, action and reaction of two Koreas, and domestic factors of both Koreas. With the end of the cold war, while the importance of international factor has relatively declined, the importance of domestic factor has rather rapidly increased in the analysis of crisis on the Korean peninsula.

To examine the future of the cycle of nuclear/missile crisis in the region, this study will begin with the brief review of three crisis such as Yongbyon crisis, Kumchangri crisis, and Daepodong crisis. Then, we will analyse Kangsong Taeguk (A Strong and Prosperous State) as North Korea's national goal in the 21st century, and Perry report as a road map for Washington's new North Korea Policy. And, finally, this study will examine a new complex strategy which can solve the circles of nuclear/missile crisis on the Korean peninsula.

Yongbyon Crisis

In the mid-1950s, the United States and the Soviet Union began their global competition for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Under these circumstances, the Yongbyon nuclear research complex was established with the help of 1956 agreements between North Korea and the Soviet Union on nuclear research cooperation. In 1959 North Korea signed additional protocols on the peaceful use of nuclear energy with both the Soviet Union and PRC. The construction of North Korea's first nuclear reactor began in 1963 and it reached critical status in 1965.

During the 1970s and the 1980s, Yongbyon nuclear research complex was continuously expanded. The construction of North Korea's first indigenously designed and constructed 5MWe gas-graphite reactor began in 1979 and the reactor reached a critical status in 1985. In 1984, North Korea began to construct its 50MWe gas-graphite reactor. In addition, North Korea began the construction of a reprocessing plant in 1987. It consisted of two parallel reprocessing lines, one of which was completed in the late 1989/early 1990.[2]

In the late 1980's, facing the historical turmoil in the Soviet Union, North Korea experienced difficulties in maintaining itself because of its loss of international power and weakening of domestic economy. In order for its own survival, North Korea has pursued the three-tier post-cold war strategy. Namely, the strengthening its political, military, and economic capabilities, raising its international status through improving relations with advanced capitalist countries such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, and maintaining of status quo wit South Korea.

In September 1990, Soviet foreign minister Eduard Shevardnadze went to Pyongyang to notify soviet intention of granting diplomatic recognition to South Korea. In the meeting, his North Korean counterpart Kim Young Nam responded against recognition of the South, as follows : first, the establishment of ties between the Soviet Union and South Korea would give international legitimacy to the permanent division of Korea ; second, recognition by Moscow would embolden South Korea to try harder to destroy socialism in the North ; third, Pyongyang would be free to recognize other parts of the Soviet Union ; fourth, as Soviet recognition of the South would destroy the basis of the 1961 security treaty, the North would feel free to take its own actions in the Asia-Pacific region and not be obligated to consult the USSR in considering its policy ; fifth, with the alliance a dead letter, North Korea would consider itself no longer bound by pledges not to create any weapons (nuclear weapons) it desired.[3]

It shows that, as South Korean nuclear weapon program of the 1970s was mainly originated from the development of survival strategy for managing the gradual withdrawal of US troops from South Korea[4], North Korean nuclear weapon program of the 1990s is closely related with the development of survival strategy for the post cold-war period.

On the other hand, US President Bill Clinton's foreign policy placed great stress on nonproliferation activities and on pressuring unfriendly Third World countries into complying with U.S. -backed technology controls. Clinton told the U.N. General Assembly in September 1993, "I have made nonproliferation one of our nation's highest priorities. We intend to weave it more deeply into the fabric of all of our relationship with the world's nations and institutions. We seek to build a world of increasing pressures for nonproliferation, but increasing trade and technology for those countries that live by accepted international rules."[5]

When President Clinton visited Seoul after the meeting at Tokyo, he made the following remarks to Korean National Assembly on July 10 1993: "I believe there are four priorities for the security of our new Pacific community. First, a continued American military commitment to this region. Second, stronger efforts to combat the proliferations of weapons of mass destruction. Third, new regional dialogues on the full range of our common security challenges. And, last, support for democracy need more open societies throughout this region. … The second priority for our new Pacific community is to combat the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. We cannot let the expanding threat of the deadly weapons replace the Cold War nightmare of nuclear annihilation. And today, the possibility is too real."[6]

In this situation, while North Korea tried to develop continuously its nuclear capabilities, the United State made every effort in controlling the risk of nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. In December 1991, North Korea concluded with South Korea, an Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation, and Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. Under the Joint Declaration, both Koreas agreed not to test, produce, receive, possess, story, deploy, or use nuclear weapons." Going beyond their obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty, they pledged not to possess facilities for nuclear reprocessing and enrichment.

On January 30, 1992 North Korea signed a nuclear safeguards agreement with the IAEA. On May 4, North Korea supplied the IAEA with a 150-page "initial report" declaring its nuclear facilities and materials. On May 11-16, IAEA Director-General Hans Blix made an official visit to North Korea. However, the subsequent six rounds of IAEA inspection team discovered between the period of May 1992 and February 1993 inconsistencies with North Korean initial declaration, and tried to clarify inconsistencies.[7]

On February 26, the day after the IAEA Board of Governors formally endorsed the demand for mandatory "special inspection" of the suspect sites, Blix sent a telex to the North Korean Foreign Ministry requesting that IAEA inspectors be permitted to travel to Yongbyon on March 16 to examine the two disputed places.

On March 12, North Korea announced it was withdrawing from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It cited the treaty's escape clause on defending supreme national interests. North Korea's two reasons for withdrawal are: the Team Spirit "nuclear war rehearsal" military exercise, and the IAEA demand for special inspection of two suspect sites.

In early May, with about a month to go before the June 12 deadline, North Korea initiated to have talks on the nuclear issue. Right before the deadline, US Assist Secretary of State for politico-military affairs, Robert L. Gallucci and North Korean deputy foreign minister Kang Sok-ju concluded a six-paragraph joint statement. The key points were the American security assurances, an agreement to continue their official dialogue and, in return, North Korean decision to "suspend" its withdrawal from the NPT for "as long as if considers necessary."

The joint statement removed the immediate threat of North Korean withdrawal from the NPT and defused the sense of crisis, but could not resolve any of the inspection issues. In spite of several efforts in resolving the nuclear issues on the peninsula, the international tension over North Korea's nuclear program heightened again in late 1993 and early 1994 In particular, the issue of the unloading of the irradiated fuel rods from the 5-MW reactor at Yongbyon deteriorated the situation rather rapidly. On June 2, when move than 60 percent of the fuel rods had been removed without IAEA supervision, Blix sent a strong letter to the UN Security Council that was an implicit call for international action. On June 5, North Korea issued a formal statement announcing that "sanctions mean war, and there is no mercy in war."

Former Secretary Defense William Perry described the situation as follows : In June of 1994, the United States was close to a military conflict over the nuclear program they had centered at Yongbyon. We were literally within a day of imposing severe sanctions on North Korea … sanctions which they said would be equivalent to an act of war. We were within a day of making major additions to our troop deployments in Korea, and we were about to undertake an evacuation of American civilians from Korea.

Facing the serious situation, Kim Il Sung made two requests to resolve the crisis in his meeting with former President Carter on June 16 according to Carter's account of the meeting: One was that the U.S. support their acquisition of light-water reactor technology. …… His second request was that the U.S. guarantee that there will be no nuclear attack against his country. He wanted the third round of U.S.-NK talks to be resumed to resolve all the outstanding nuclear issues. He was willing to freeze their nuclear program during the talks, and to consider a permanent freeze if their aged reactor could be replaced with modern and safer ones.[8]

In parallel, Perry concluded that the plan for an attack on the reactor site was very likely to incite the North Koreans to launch a military attack on South Korea. Even though the North Koreans would surely lose this second War, they could cause hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions of casualties before being defeated, Therefore, he favored putting pressure on the North Koreans with a program of tough sanctions. Thus Perry was preparing to recommend a large, immediate increase in military forces deployed in Korea.[9]

Based on Kim II Sung's requests, direct U.S-North Korean negotiation began shortly after, and reached the Agreed Framework on October 21. The Agreed Framework included that, while North Korea continues the freeze on its activities at Yongbyon, the United States would organize an international consortium to provide light water reactors, the United States would arrange to supply 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually before the light-water reactors came into operation, The two states would reduce existing barriers to trade and investment and open diplomatic liaison offices in each other's capitals as initial steps toward eventual full normalization of relations, The United States would provide formal assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons against North Korea, and North Korea would implement the 1991 North-South joint declaration on the demilitarization of the Korean peninsula and reengage in North-South dialogue.

Kumchangri Crisis

After the Geneva agreement, there were two opposing views on the implementation of the agreed framework. The optimistic view argued that North Korean behavior would improve as a result of the agreed framework. On the other hand, the pessimistic view argued that North Korea had a possibility of a clandestine and undetected military buildup.

Under these circumstances, the New York Times reported on August 17, 1988 that U.S. intelligence agencies detected a huge secret underground complex in North Korea that is believed to be the centerpiece of intensive efforts to revive the country's frozen nuclear weapons program.[10] The discovery of Kumchangri raised the suspicion that North Korea was violating the agreement, and that it could not be verified. In return, the discovery led both houses of congress to adopt the restriction on further US funding to implement the Agreed Framework. In addition, President Clinton appointed former Defense Secretary William Perry as US Policy Coordinator for North Korea to resolve the dilemma of US policy toward North Korea.

On the other hand, North Korea strongly argued that Kumchangri was a civilian site and thus could not be accessed. In order to resolve differences concerning Kumchangri, the United States and North Korea agreed to hold a series of meeting.[11]

In the first round of talks on August 22-25, while the United States opposed the construction of Kumchangri, and requested access to inspect the site, North Korea insisted the purpose of Kumchangri is civilian-related, and refused to grant the US access to the site. However, in the second round of talks on November 16-18, North Korea offered the U.S. access in return for $ 300 million in compensation. On the other hand, the United States refused to pay compensatory fee for access.

Before entering the third round of talks on December 4-11, North Korea escalated its hostile rhetoric. A spokesman for the General Staff of the DPRK People's Army on December 2 accused the United States of taking a hard-line stance toward the DPRK's suspected nuclear site as an excuse to start a war. The spokesman stated, "Now that the United States imperialists, having thrown off the mask of 'dialogue' and 'negotiation', are bringing the situation to the brink of war, we solemnly declare..... that our revolutionary armed forces will never pardon the challenge of the U.S. imperialist aggression forces but answer it with an annihilating blow."[12]

In the fourth round of talks on January 16-24, 1999, the United States demanded multiple on-site inspection of site and suggested offering food and economic assistance in return for access.

After having a fifth round of talks on February 27-March 15 for the agreement on details of on-site visit and food assistance, the United States and North Korea concluded an agreement on March 16 in which Pyongyang promised to allow Washington to conduct multiple inspections of the suspected nuclear site in Kumchangri in exchange for massive food aid.[13] The U.S. State Department announced on May 27 that U.S officials investigating facility find only an unfinished site with vast, empty tunnels, but with no evidence of nuclear activities.

Taepodong Crisis

In the midst of disputing over the suspected underground facilities at Kumchangri, North Korea launched on August 31, 1998 a three-stage Taepodong 1 missile across Japan and into the Pacific Ocean.[14] North Korea announced on September 4 1998 that it placed its first artificial satellite "Kwangmyongsong No. 1 (Bright Lodestar)" in orbit. According to the Korea Central News Agency, "The successful launch of the first artificial satellite in the DPRK greatly encourages the Korean people in the efforts to build a powerful socialist state under the wise leadership of General Secretary Kim Jung Il." At the same time, a spokesman for the DPRK Ministry said, "The satellite launch is one more fruit of the independent national economy, a product of 100 percent local technology and local effort. This gives pride and delight to the Korean nation and their friends...... The artificial satellite recently launched just before the historic first session of the 10th Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK manifests the iron will and indomitable spirit of our party, army, and people who are working hard for the greater prosperity of the country, pulling through difficulties."[15]

North Korea's official statements show rather clearly that the launch of "Kwangmyongsong No. 1" should be interpreted as the starting signal of the building of Kangsong Taeguk under the leadership of Kim Jung Il. It means that, as long as Kim Jung Il pursues the goal of "Kangsong Taeguk", North Korean ballistic missile program will be remained as a symbol of survival strategy in the 21st century.

As Table 1 shows, during the 1980s, North Korea tested, SCUD A, SCUD B, and SCUD C. US Department of Defense estimates that the North Korean Armed force have several hundred SCUD-like missiles and have exported many to other countries. During the same period, North Korea developed the No Dong, which has an estimated range of 1,300km and a payload of 1200kg tested it in 1993, and deployed them at more than ten bases. During the 1990s, North Korea has made significant progress in improving its ballistic missile capabilities. It has produced, deployed and exported missiles to Iran and Pakistan, launched on August 31, 1998 a three-stage missile, Taepodong 1, and continued to develop a larger and more powerful longer-range missile, Taepoding 2. In particular, it is estimated that a three-stage Taepodong 2 could deliver a payload of several hundred kilograms, equivalent to an early generation nuclear weapon, anywhere in the United States.

Table 1. NORTH KOREA'S BALLISTIC MISSILE CAPABILITY

Source: North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (November 1999): Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr. A History of Ballistic Missile Development in the D.P.R.K., Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Occasional Paper #2 (1999)

In this situation, to assess the ballistic missile threat to the United States, a bipartisan Rumsfeld was nominated by congress in 1997 and submitted the report on July 15, 1998. The report concluded that "Concerted efforts by a number of overly or potentially hostile nations to acquire ballistic missiles with biological or nuclear payloads pose a growing threat to the United States, its deployed forces and its friends and allies.…… The newer ballistic missile-equipped nations' capabilities will not match those of U.S. systems for accuracy or reliability. However, they would be able to inflict major destruction on the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability…The threat to the U.S. posed by these emerging capabilities is broader, more mature and evolving more rapidly than has been reported in estimate and reports by the Intelligence Community…… The warning times the U.S. can expect of new, threatening ballistic missile deployments are being reduced……Therefore, we unanimously recommend that U.S. analyses, practices and policies that depend on expectations of extended warning of deployment be reviewed and, as appropriate, revised to reflect the reality of an environment in which there may be little or no warning."[16]

In more detail, this report evaluated the ballistic missile program, weapons of massive destruction program, missile export of North Korea as a major threat to American interests, and potentially to the United States itself.

To resolve the dilemma of their different positions on North Korean ballistic missile program, the United States and North Korea had five rounds of negotiations.[17] The first two rounds of missile talks were held in April 1996 and June 1997. While the United States urged North Korea to stop ballistic missile production, halt missile exports, and join the Missile Technology Control Regime, North Korea rejected these proposals.

During the third round of negotiations on October 1-2 1998, the United Stats offered to relax U.S. economic sanctions against North Korea as a compensation of the abandonment of missile development and export. North Korea rejected the offer on the ground that the United States was already required under the 1994 Agreed Framework to relax economic sanctions. North Korea insisted that its missile program was strictly for self-defense and that it had a sovereign right as a state to develop missiles.

A fourth round of talks were held in March 29-30, 1999. North Korea offered to suspend missile exports over a three-year period for annual cash payment of $ 1 billion from the U.S. The United States rejected the North Korean proposal, but renewed the offer to lift economic sanctions in successive stages in exchange for cooperation on missile issues.

In a fifth round of talks on September 7-12, North Korea agreed to freeze temporarily its long-range missile test program in return for an easing of U.S sanction. On September 17, the United States announced its partial lifting of sanctions against North Korea. On September 24, North Korea's foreign Ministry declared that Pyongyang will not test-fire a missile, as long as talks with Washington continue.

Kangsong Taeguk

The brief review of three major North Korean nuclear/missile crises during the 1990s shows that in its initial stage, the crisis was mainly originated from the conflict of North Korea's post cold war survival strategy and the US nonproliferation policy, in its middle stage, both countries tried to maximize their goals based on the diplomacy of brinkmanship, and, in its final stage, both actors tried to make a compromise through the accommodation of mutual interests.

Thus, to forecast the future of nuclear/missile crisis on the Korean peninsula in the 21st century, it is essential to begin with the analysis of North Korea's survival strategy in the 21st century, Kangsong Taeguk.

On the future of North Korea, there have been three competing arguments of collapse, muddling through and reform.[18] Entering the 1990's, as North Korea experienced the rapid deterioration of its economy. North Korea watchers began to worry about the possibility of sudden collapse, and suggested the soft-landing policy as an alternative. However, in opposition to the expectation of sudden collapse, North Korea continued "Konan ui Haenggun (march under trials)." Subsequently, the argument of muddling through has become more popular among North Korean watchers. In the midst of the expectation of muddling through, Pyongyang strongly proposed as a motto for the 21st century construction of Kangsong Taeguk.

The motto of Kangsong Taeguk was first appeared in a lengthy editorial of Rodong Shinmun on August 22, 1998 as follows : "……To construct a strong and prosperous state of Juche is the most sacred and patriotic task of our country and our people. A strong Korean nation weighed again its anchor for this historical task, … This task concerns the patriotic and loyal pledges Great General vowed before the predecessor, head of state, the fatherland and the nation, and a grand blueprint to guide Korea, thus glorifying the 21st century brilliantly...... Our Great General's construction method of strong and prosperous State of Juche is to begin with the establishment of strong state of ideology, and then establish the military strongly based on the revolutionary spirit, and, with this military power, to make the striking leap of economic construction."[19]

The joint editorial of New Year' Day 1999 for the papers of the Workers' Party, the People's Army and the Kim Il Sung socialist Youth League defined 1999 as the year for a turning point in building a Kangsong Taeguk.[20] On New Years' Day 2000, the joint editorial described once more the New Year Juche 89 as a year of general advance to effect a significant stride forward in the building of a powerful nation under the leadership of the great Workers Party of Korea. It stated : "The general march today is the struggle to make a leap in constructing a Kangsong Taeguk under the leadership of Great Comrade and a sacred struggle to demonstrate the great power of socialism of our own style. Our ideal and hope is the construction of a Kangsong Taeguk and the goal of our victory is the flag of socialism of our own style...... We should step up the general march this year, firmly maintaining the policy line of giving great importance to ideology, arms and science and technology. Ideology, arms and science and technology are the three major pillars for the building of a strong and prosperous state. Steadfast ideology, strong arms and advanced science and technology represent a strong and prosperous socialist state of Juche."[21]

The motto of Kangsong Taeguk is a reconfiguring of late leader Kim Il-Sung's ruling principle-"political independence, economic self-reliance, and military self-defense." The term Kangsong Taeguk refers to a state with strong foundation in three main sectors-ideology/ politics, the military and the economy. Among these three sectors, North Korea places a special priority on ideology and politics. The editorial of Rodong Shinmun titled "Let us open the new construction of a Kangsong Taeguk with the power of our great and complete unity" stated on February 16, 1999: "We are faced with the glorious mission of exploring the era of a Kangsong Taeguk through greater unity behind the great Ryongdoja(Leader), comrade Kim Jong-il. We should protect and maintain our unity like our very eyeballs. This Unity originates in the spirit in which we safeguard the Suryong, (Great Leader), even at the cost of our lives."[22]

In addition, North Korea gives a special emphasis on the ideological education under the leadership of Kim Jong-il. The editorial of Rodong Shinmun titled "Let's reject the ideological and cultural infiltration of imperialism" argues on June 1, 1999: "It is a truth verified through the history of humanity that a socialist society cannot maintain itself if it allows entry of even a trivial element of decadent capitalism. The Soviet union and the socialist countries in East Europe collapsed not because their military or economic power was weak or their cultural standards were low, but because they opened their doors to the infiltrating ideology and culture of imperialism ...... It is suicide to allow the ideological and cultural infiltration of imperialism to turn us away from ideological programs to make us become absorbed only in economic construction. Of course, successful economic construction is important in elevating the people's material and cultural living standards. But the damages caused by the ruling party in a socialist country that is interested only in practical economic problems while neglecting ideological programs, cannot be compensated by anything ...... In all areas of social life we must install mosquito nets (against the ideological and cultural infiltration of imperialism). Struggles to counter the decadent winds of capitalism are a campaign involving all society, which must be staged in all political, economic and cultural fields. The ideological and political sector must not accept the openness and pluralism propagated by the imperialists and socialist traitors. The economic sector must not adopt capitalist business management practices, reforms and openings. The literary and art sectors must reject the theory of "art for art's sake" and the freedom of creative writing favored by lazy people."[23]

The pursuit of military power is the second goal in the building of Kangsong Taeguk. On the occasion of the 67th anniversary of the birth of the People's Army, the editorial of Rodong Shinmun titled "The Korean People's Army, which has succeeded the bloodline of Mt. Paektu, is invincible" stated on April 25, 1999: "The military ideology and theory of our Party, which were created by Great Suryong (Leader, Kim Il-sung), are the guiding principles that we must abide by in strengthening the military power of our country by various means...... It was General Kim Jong-il who presented the theory that the Army is equal to the (Workers') Party and elevated the status of the Army to the top of Society. Today our revolutionary armed forces are enjoying the most prosperous period in their history...... Strengthening the People's Army is the only way to maintain the sovereignty of our nation and guarantee the construction of our country as a Kangsong Taeguk...... The People's Army is the main force of our revolution. On its guns and spears rests the fate of our fatherland and revolution, and they will determine the success or failure of our programs to turn our fatherland into a Kangsong Taeguk."[24]

The joint editorial of New Years' Day 2000 also mentioned: "To attach great importance to arms is a strategic line that should always be held firmly as long as imperialism remains and the revolution goes on. It is the most important state affair to which top priority should be given by all units, attaching great importance to national defense is the most correct way of defending the destiny of socialism in the world today."[25]

Thus, reassuring the "Four-Point Military Line" such as the armament of the entire populace, the fortification the entire territory, the conversion of all servicemen into cadres, and the modernization of the People's Army, North Korea shows keen interest in developing technologically advanced weapons and delivery systems in the age of Revolution in Military Affairs.

The achievement of economic power is the last stage in constructing Kangsong Taeguk. The editorial of Rodong Shimun on September 7, 1998, stated: "Today, our Republic is demonstrating its prestige as a strong state, ideologically, politically, and militarily. If we make the economy vital by accelerating the building of a socialist fatherland and boosting the potential of a self-reliant economy, our fatherland will eventually shine as a strong and prosperous state in all spheres."[26]

The editorial of Rodong Shinmun on September 17, 1998, under the heading, "Let's maintain the line of building a self-sufficient national economy" defined the current trend of economic globalization as "a reactionary offensive for dismantling the national economy, whose merits are evidenced in Asian countries." It declared: "Only the self-sustaining economy of a country can guarantee a solid independence free of foreign interference in its citizens' daily lives, a secure concrete foundation for the enjoyment of Juche in ideology, independence in politics and self-reliance in national defense, and provide the abundant materials necessary for civilized life."[27] To sum up, North Korea will manage its economy under strict ideological and political guideline while allowing limited benefits to its citizens.

In the process of construction of Kangsong Taeguk, we should give attention that Kim Jong-il gives priority to ideological/political power based on the logic of revolution and military power based on the logic of war-both taking precedence over economic power determined by the logic of capital. Thus, as long as the strong and prosperous state will be built based on the present blueprint, the logic of capital will be pursued within the logic of revolution and war. In this perspective, we can understand why a poverty-stricken country in which so many are left to starve continues to devote the bulk of its resources to developing nuclear and missile capabilities. In addition, as North Korean nuclear/missile program is the symbol of Kangsong Taeguk, it will be preferentially pursued.

Pyongyang's pursuit of a Kangsong Taeguk, with an ideological/political and military pillars as a primary goal, and economic pillar as a secondary goal, can be defined as a new national goal for the 21st century. To achieve this goal, North Korea is now pursuing three-fold strategy-the utilization of international capabilities including the United States, Japan, and the European Union, the strengthening of domestic revolutionary capabilities based on the party, the military, and the bureaucracy, and the strengthening of South Korea's revolutionary capabilities with the strategy of united front.

Perry Report

In August 1998, the report of a suspected underground facilities at Kumchangri and North Korea's launch of long-range missile over Japan increased the risk of nuclear/missile crisis on the Korean peninsula. In this environment, U.S. Congress called for an outside policy review, and the President Clinton asked former Secretary of Defense William Perry to undertake it.

After reviewing such policy alternatives as status quo, undermining the DPRK, reforming the DPRK, and "buying" our objects, Perry recommended two-path strategy as a better alternative. He summarized his recommendation as follows: "This recommended alternative involves a comprehensive and integrated approach to U.S. negotiations with the DPRK. In essence, we have recommended that the allies establish two alternative strategies. In the first, if the DPRK is willing to forgo its long-range missile program as well as its nuclear weapons program, we should be willing to move step-by-step on a path to a comprehensive normalization of relations, including the establishment of a permanent peace. Alternatively, however, if North Korea does not demonstrate by its action that it is willing to remove the threat, we must take actions to contain that threat."[28]

In sum, the report explained that its ultimate goal was to terminate missile exports and indigenous missile activities inconsistent with MTCR standards, but that suspending long-range missile testing was the logical first step.

However, Perry report will face three major dilemmas which will likely cause another round of hot debate on the engagement policy in the United States, Japan, and South Korea. First, right after the Berlin agreement and the Perry report, both the United States and South Korean government are showing their expectation of normalization of relations between the United States and North Korea. In the process of short-term measure, it is likely that North Korea will temporarily suspend its missile test-firing while the United States will ease economic sanctions on Pyongyang. However, in the process of mid-term goal, both the United States and North Korea will face serious dilemma. It will be extremely difficult for the United States to draw the North Korea's reliable guarantee that it would cease engaging in nuclear and missile development. At the same time, North Korea will strongly demand the peace treaty with the United States and also the withdrawal of U.S. military forces in Korea as a package deal.

Under these circumstances, two rival political parties in the United States will potentially involve in debating the effectiveness of the Perry report. Along with the Perry report, there have been two major reports which represent the Republican perspective on the issue.

In his report entitled "A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea," Richard L. Armitage argues, after criticizing the unreality of three major assumptions of current U.S. policy toward the Korean peninsula on the cessation of North Korea's nuclear program, imminent collapse, and radical market-orient reform, "one cannot expect North Korea to take U.S. diplomacy seriously unless we demonstrate unambiguously that the United States is prepared to bolster its deterrent military posture. This can be done without appearing to threaten Pyongyang. At the same time, policy should provide an adequate incentive structure to any forces inside the North Korean elite who may be inclined to believe that the least bad choice for survival is one of civil international behavior and opening. To convince the North to modify its posture, we need a larger conceptual framework, with greater incentives and corresponding disincentives."[29]

In more detail, Armitage asserts, "The objective of negotiation should be to offer Pyongyang clear choices in regard to its future: on the one hand, economic benefits, security assurances, political legitimation, on the other hand, the certainty of enhanced military deterrence. For the U.S. and its allies, the package as a whole means that we are prepared-if Pyongyang meets our concerns-to accept North Korea as a legitimate actor, up to and including full normalization of relations." However, should diplomacy fail, the United States would have to consider two alternative courses of strengthened deterrence and containment, and preemption.

In November 1999, North Korea Advisory Group, the Republican taskforce, released a congressional report on the question: "Does North Korea pose a great threat to U.S. interests today than it did five years age?"[30] In sum, the report says that: first, North Korea is continuing its activities to develop nuclear/missile capabilities; second, North Korea currently strike the United States with a missile capable of delivering a chemical, biological, or possibly, nuclear weapon; third, the United States has replaced the Soviet Union as the prime benefactor of North Korea with some $ 645 million in aid over the past five years; fourth, the North Korean regime has the worst human right record of any government in the world.

In South Korea, there are two opposing views on the Perry report. The editorial of Chosun-Ilbo entitled "Unimpressive Report" evaluated the report negatively.[31] It analyzed that the Perry report appeared somewhat too optimistic on the situation of the peninsula. In addition, it stated, the report shows the imbalance of stick and carrot for the implementation of recommendations. And, it also argued that, even if Perry's recommendations are implemented smoothly, they do not guarantee the improvement of South-North Korea relations. On the other hand, the editorial of Hangyorae-Sinmun entitled "Having a High Expectation on Perry Report" evaluated the report very highly. [32] It mentioned that, if the report will be implemented successfully, it will not only normalize U.S.-North Korea relations but also dismantle the cold-war structure on the Korean peninsula. In the case of new cycle of North Korean nuclear/missile crisis, these two contrasting views in South Korea will engage in a serious debate.

Second, after the Berlin Agreement and the Perry report, optimistic government officials and North Korea watcher in South Korea argue that the progress in U.S.-North Korean relations is expected to make a contribution to the improvement in South-North Korea relations. On the other hand, pessimistic North Korea watchers refuted very strongly that even if Perry's recommendations are implemented smoothly, there is no guarantee of an improvement in inter-Korean relations. On the contrary, it is likely that the better Washington-Pyongyang relations improve, the more the North Korean government will try to contain the South Korean government.

In February 1999, the North proposed that if the South Korean government would satisfy the preconditions including the severance of its cooperative ties with foreign powers and the suspension of joint military exercises with foreign troops, the abolition of the national security law, and the guarantee of free activities of all "unification-loving forces" in the South, the North will hold a high-level inter-Korean political dialogue aimed at easing tensions on the Korean Peninsula during the second half of the year. In September 1999, North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun said the North was ready to hold summit talks with south Korea if Seoul accepts Pyongyang's previous proposal for a high level political meeting.[33]

Related with the national security law, the ruling National Congress for new Politics (NCNP) has advised the government to revise it in three areas: namely to redefine the nature of praising North Korea, scrap the failure to report espionage clause, and review the definition of the anti-government organization. On the other hand, the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) is taking the position that, as long as North Korea continue the policy of "opening relations with the United States and containing South Korea," the North would not accept south Korea's revision of national security law as the satisfaction of precondition. In consequence, the GNP believes that the North Korean government's effort of containing the South Korean government will increase in proportion to improvements in the U.S.-North Korean relationship.

Third, the engagement policy of the United States and the allied will face the dilemma that the dismantlement of the cold-war structure as a long-term goal for the solution of the Korean question cannot be automatically understood as the end of cold-war on the Korean peninsula.

As the cold-war system in Korea was developed by the complex combinations of global competition of great powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union in Northeast Asia, action and reaction of two Koreas, and the cold-war nature of domestic systems of two Koreas, the end of cold-war can be successfully implemented by dissolving simultaneously cold-war structure and cold-war actor.

A New Complex Strategy

To escape from the vicious cycle of North Korean nuclear/missile crisis, it is necessary to develop a more sophisticated complex strategy for the management of Kangsong Taeguk in the 21st century.

In South Korea, after experiencing the harsh reality of Korean situation including naval clashes in the West Sea in June 1999, Kim Dae-jung government has to take a more balanced view on the equal importance of security and reconciliation. It means that Seoul has to pursue selective engagement policy instead of comprehensive engagement policy. On the occasion of the 54th anniversary of National Liberation on August 15, 1999, President Kim Dae-jung stated as follows: Peace on the Korean peninsula requires that we guard our security and promote reconciliation with the North at the same time. War must be prevented with a firm security stance. As amply demonstrated in the South-North exchange of fire in the Yellow Sea, our engagement policy is not a policy of appeasement that takes security lightly. We must continue to maintain the firm and credible deterrence provided by the ROK-US combined defense posture. Meanwhile, I will continue to promote engagement to bring about peace and cooperation with North Korea. Since the start of the Government of the People, there has been a number of provocations from North Korea. But the government has remained unswayed in promoting exchanges and cooperation for peace on the Korean peninsula. As a result, we now see a considerable level of South-North exchanges.[34]

On the other hand, in his address to the Asia Society in New York on September 13, 1999, Lee Hoi-chang, President of the Grand National Party addressed as follows: In the past, South Korean government have based their policies toward the North on the assumption that the collapse of the regime was imminent. Their main focus was on the threat, and their approach tended toward the hard-line. By contrast, the current administration's approach assumes that the North Korean regime will continue to rule, downplays the threat, and tends toward a policy of appeasement. We must start with a strong deterrence. ...... While maintaining a strong and credible deterrence, we must also embark on a policy of engagement. For a fundamental resolution of the North Korea issue, there must be basic changes in North Korea's policy and regime. Although it is difficult to effect change in a society by exerting pressure from outside, it is not impossible to help enhance internal demands for change. To this end, we should steadily expand contacts and exchanges with the North in the economic, cultural, intellectual and other realms...... But, I would add one important none-negotiable caveat: Engagement is not a one-way street. Our engagement policy must be purposeful, conditional and selective, which is to say it must factor in North Korea's willingness to cooperate on improving peace on the peninsula.[35]

To cope with the complex reality of inter-Korean relations, South Korea's ruling and opposition parties have tried to develop a realistic and sophisticated North Korea policy. As a result, there are some similarities in the ruling Millennium Democratic Party's argument of security and reconciliation and the opposition Grand National Party's advocate of credible deterrence and constructive engagement. However, although they are using the same terms such as deterrence and engagement, it is clear that they have different views on the future of changes in North Korea's policy and regime, and the criteria of selective engagement.

For the successful management of North Korea's Kangsong Taeguk policy in the 21st century, a new complex strategy should begin with the strengthening of non-offensive deterrence. The pursuit of North Korea's Kunsa Kangguk (military greatpower) policy should not be given to threaten the peace and prosperity of Korea and East Asia. For this purpose, unilateral and multilateral non-offensive deterrence system should be economically developed to nullify the military and political effects of North Korea's nuclear/missile capabilities. Based on this deterrence system, Korea and its allied should promote the diplomacy of establishing peace system of Korea and East Asia. In particular, nuclear/missile talks should be done with the full understanding of the dynamics of the cycle of North Korean nuclear/missile crisis.

The second requirement of complex strategy is to control the negative impact of North Korea's Sasang·Jongchi Kangguk (ideological/political greatpower) policy on the political stability of Korea and East Asia. To achieve this goal, South Korea and its allied should pursue a policy of benign neglect to North Korea's political war based on the strategy of anti-foreignism and united front.

The third requirement of complex strategy is to support North Korea's Kyongje Kangguk (economic greatpower) policy. In the present situation, as North Korean leadership has lost the capability of effective management of North Korean economic system, Korean Energy Development Organization (KEDO) type of multilateral governance system should be rapidly pursued in the major sectors of agriculture, high-technology, information, and environment in North Korea.

The successful implementation of a new complex strategy will end the cycle of North Korean nuclear/missile crisis and initiate the peace and prosperous system of Korea and East Asia.

[1]) On the general history of three major North Korean nuclear/missile crises, see Michael J. Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation (London:  MachMillan, 1995); Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas' A Contemporary History(Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1997); Leon V. Sigal, Diasrming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea (Princeton: Princeton University, 1998); Ashton B. Carter & William J. Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1999); Chuck Downs, Over the Line: North Korea's Negotiating Strategy (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1999); James clay Moltz & Alexandre Y. Mansourov, (eds.) The North Korean Nuclear program: Security Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000)

[2]) Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, Chronologies: North Korean Nuclear Developments (1947-1999) (http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/chr4789.htm); Joseph S. Bermudez Jr, "Exposing North Korea's Secret Nuclear Infrastructure: Part I/II, Jane's Intelligence Review July 1999, pp.36-40/August 1999, pp41-45.

[3]) Oberdorfer, op. cit., pp.213-218; Alexander Platkovskiy, "Nuclear Blackmail and North Korea's Search for a Place in the Sun," in Moltz & Mansourov, op. cit. pp. .93-100.

[4]) Young-Sun Ha, Nuclear Proliferation, World Order and Korea. (Seoul: Seoul National University Press, 1993)  ch. 4.

[5]) Address to the U.N. General Assembly, New York, N.Y. September 21, 1993, as transcribed in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 27, 1993, p.651

[6]) Address by Bill Clinton before the National Assembly of Korea, Seoul, South Korea, July 10, 1993, as transcribed in U.S. Department of State Dispatch, July 19, 1993, p.510.

[7]) CNS, Chronolgies: North Korean Nuclear Developments (1949-1999); Chronologies: IAEA-North Korea: Nuclear Safeguards and Infrastructure (1977-1999) (http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/nuc/iaea.7789htm)

[8]) Downs, op.cit., p.241

[9]) Carter & Perry, ch.4.

[10]) New York Times, August 17, 1998

[11]) CNS, North Korea's Alleged Nuclear Facility at Kumchang-ri (http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/uncover.htm)

[12]) Nautilus Institute, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network Daily Report, December2, 1998

[13]) Nautilus Institute, op,cit., March17, 1999.

[14]) Joseph. S. Bermudez, Jr. A history of Ballistic Missile Development in the D.P.R.K. CNS occasional paper #2 (http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/opapers/op2/: North Korea Advisory Group, Report to the Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (November1999): CNS, Chronology of North Korea's Missile Trade and Developments (http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/chron2.htm): CNS., North Korea: A Second Taepo-dong Test? (http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/taep2.htm)

[15]) Rodong Shinmun, September4, 1998

[16]) Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Report (July 15, 1998)

[17]) CNS, A Second Taepo-dong Test?

[18]) Marcus Noland, "Why North Korea will muddle Through," Foreign Affairs, July/August 1997.

[19]) Rodong Shinmun, August 22, 1998

[20]) Rodong Shinmun, January 1. 1999

[21]) Rodong Shinmun, January 1, 2000

[22]) Rodong Shinmun, February 16, 1999

[23]) Rodong Shinmun, June 1, 1999

[24]) Rodong Shinmun, April 25, 1999

[25]) Rodong Shinmun, January 1, 2000

[26]) Rodong Shinmun, September 7, 1998

[27]) Rodong Shinmun, September 17, 1998

[28]) William J. Perry, Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations (http://www.state.gov/www/regions/991012_northkorea_rpt.html)

[29]) Richard L. Armitage, "A Comprehensive Approach to North Korea," The Strategic Forum No.159 (March 1999).

[30]) North Korea Advisory Group, Report

[31]) Chosun-Ilbo, September 17, 1999

[32]) Hangyorae-Shinmun, September 16, 1999

[33]) Nautilus Institute, Northeast Asia Peace and Security Network, Special Roport: DPRK Letter to ROK

[34]) "To Open a new Millennium of Hope and Prosperity," Address by President Kim Dae-jung on the 54th Anniversary of National Liberation, August 15, 1999

[35]) "Korea's Economic and Political Challenges for the New Millennium," Address to Asia Society in New York by Lee Hoi-Chang, President of the Grand National Party of the Republic of Korea, September 13, 1999